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THE UNAUTHORIZED PRACTICE OF LAW
BY REALTORS IN FLORIDA-
THE ST. PETERSBURG SUITS
LEONARD W. COOPERMAN*
INTRODUCTION
It is generally agreed that realtors cannot validly render opinions for
others concerning the validity or marketability of titles to real property.1
Likewise agreement exists that realtors cannot, with or without compensa-
tion, prepare or fill in for others forms of instruments in real estate trans-
actions in which they do not act as brokers.
2
Now a controversy is raging in Florida over the right of realtors to fill
in forms of deeds, mortgages and the like in real estate transactions in which
they act as brokers and for which service they make no charge additional to
their brokers' commission. The emphasis in this article will be placed upon
the present conflict.
THE KEYES DECISION
In 1950, the Supreme Court of Florida apparently decided in Keyes Co.
Y. Dade County Bar Association,3 that a realtor, corporate or individual, is
to be restricted in the drafting and filling in of documents in real estate trans-
actions handled as a broker to the preliminary contract, memorandum or
deposit receipt recording the agreement of the parties to sell, buy or lease.
The court reasoned that the real estate license law'4 authorizes a realtor to
do work which is in its nature preliminary in negotiating any transaction
which is calculated to or results in a sale, exchange or leasing of property.
Thus, it impliedly authorizes such person to record the handiwork which
entitles him to his compensation in a preliminary memorandum deposit
receipt or contract evidencing the preliminary agreement of the parties. The
court said:
Once this point is reached, the field is the lawyer's, and he then
should do those things necessary to the consummation of the con-
tract.
•.. The examination of abstracts, quieting of titles, the conduct of
suits in ejectment and the like fall entirely within the sphere of the
lawyer; and the preparation and execution of the instruments effec-
tuating transfer should be under the lawyer's supervision, if the
parties decide that they need expert advice and service.'
*LL.B. 1932, University of Florida; president 1951, St. Petersburg Bar Asso-
ciation; member of the Florida Bar Committee on Unauthorized Practice of Law.
1. Grievance Committee v. Payne, 128 Conn. 325, 22 A.2d 623 (1941); Keyes
Co. v. Dade County Bar Ass'n., 46 So.2d 605 (Fla. 1950); FLA. STAT. § 475.25(h)
(1951); State v. Ferguson, 145 Ohio St. 12, 60 N.E.2d 476 (1945); Union City v.
Waddell, 205 S.W.2d 573 (Tenn. 1947).
2. Hulse v. Criger, 247 S.W.2d 855 (Mo. 1952); Grievance Committee v. Dean,
190 S.W.2d 126 (Tex. Civ. 1945).
3. 46 So.2d 605 (Fla. 1950). The court said its consideration of the problem was
more or less in an abstract way".
4. FLA. STAT. c. 475 (1951).
5. Keyes Co. v. Dade County Bar Ass'n., 46 So.2d 605, 606 (Fla. 1950).
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To the argument made on behalf of the realtors that the conveyancing
forms filled in after the preliminary agreement were mere copies of those
prepared by an attorney, the court said;
We are not shaken in this view because of the argument that oft-
times the instrument to be executed is a copy of one which has
been prepared by an attorney. An instrument entirely adequate in
one instance may be totally inadequate in another, and even if a par-
ticular form may be common to many transactions, it may not serve
to effectuate the transfer if there are errors in the parties, the descrip-
tion, the signatures or the acknowledgment. It too often happens
that one receives an instrument which is valid on its face, only to
discover later that it has been ineffectual, and then finds himself
put to expense to correct an error which could well have been
avoided had he been properly advised at the outset.6
TIE PROBLEMi TODAY
The realtors of Florida have not accepted the Keyes decision as holding
that the law prohibits them from drafting or filling in for others forms of
deeds, mortgages, notes, leases, assignments, satisfactions and the like in
transactions in which they act as brokers or salesmen. Their views and con-
tentions are pointedly and aggressively presented in the intervention by the
Florida and St. Petersburg Boards of Realtors and many individual realtors
in current suits filed by the St. Petersburg Bar Association against two abstract
companies for declaratory decrees and to enjoin what the plaintiffs in those
suits conceive to be the unauthorized practice of law. 7 The Florida Bar also
intervened in these suits, aligning itself with the plaintiffs.
In reply to the realtors' contentions, the bar association urged that the
Keyes case has settled the matter against the realtors and their efforts now
constitute merely an attempt to relitigate that case. To judge the merits of
these contrary contentions it is necessary to pay attention to other language
in the Supreme Court's opinion, which is the basis for the contention of
the realtors, and also to give some consideration to the law established in
other states.
THE VIEWS IN GENERAL
At the time of the decision in the Keyes case, the law in other states
6. Id. at 607.
7. Cooperman v. Guarantee Abstract Co., Ch. No. 37,759, 6th Cir. Fla. 1953;
Cooperman v. West Coast Title Co., Ch. No. 37,760, 6th Cir. Fla. 1953.
They contend in asking for a declaratory decree that they have a right to fill in forms
of all instruments necessary to consummate any real estate transaction; that: (1) realtors
over a long period of years have by custom filted in such forms and should be permitted
to continue to do so; (2) that business will be stultified if such forms are required to be
drafted or filled in by lawyers; (3) that lawyers have no monopoly on such practice and
to give them one would create an illegal trade restraint in violation of the state anti-trust
law and the public interest; (4) the filling in of forms of instruments by realtors in
transactions in which they act as brokers is merely an incident of and ancillary to their
lawful business and is not the unauthorized practice of law because of their interest in the
transaction generated by the establishment and collection of their compensation for
arranging the transaction; (5) the holding in the Keyes case does not prohibit them
from such acts in transactions in which they participate as brokers or salesmen.
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on the question was in conflict,8as it is now? Summed up, the following
propositions state the law and its philosophy in the conveyancing field:
1. Most courts take the view that the lawyer's exclusive province
should include only the performance of those operations which not only
are traditionally the lawyers, but which for the protection of organized society
and the assurance of its efficient and economic operation should be per-
formed only by lawyers. However, practically all the authorities, by either
dictum or precise holding, agree that the drafting of instruments for other
persons in the field of conveyancing is the practice of law, requiring a
lawyer's services in such drafting as a requisite to public protection.' 0
2. The law recognizes that any person can, in effect practice law for
himself by preparing conveyancing instruments in those transactions in
which he is sufficiently interested to be in practical effect a party or is a
party. This, of course, is a corollary to the principle recognized by all courts
that any person can represent himself in any transaction, although admittedly
such acts if done by another for him would be the unauthorized practice
of law."
3. Some confusion has arisen in attempts by some courts to resolve
the conflict which naturally arises in applying the interest theory and at the
same time trying to reserve in the public interest the difficult phases of
the conveyancing field to the lawyers, who presumably have the overall
knowledge necessary to protect the public interests in both the simple and
the complex phases of conveyancing. These courts have mistakenly treated
the problem as one of degree, determined by the simplicity or complexity
of the instruments involved. They have fused the interest theory with a
8. E.g., People v. Shafer, 404 I11. 45, 87 N.E.2d 773 (1949); In re Gore, 58 Ohio
App. 79, 15 N.E.2d 968 (1937); Commonwealth v. Jones & Robbins, Inc., 186 Va. 30,
41 S.E.2d 720 (1947), holding the filling in of forms of deeds, mortgages, etc. by realtors,
even in transactions in which they act as brokers, is the unauthorized practice of law.
Contra: Cowern v. Nelson, 207 Minn. 642, 290 N.W. 795 (1940); Childs v. Smeltzer, 315
Pa. 9, 171 Atl. 883 (1934).
9. Hulse v. Cuger, 247 S.W.2d 855 (Mo. 1952), holding realtors may fill in
standard forms of simple instruments in transactions where they act as brokers; Wash-
ington State Bar Ass'n. v. Washington Ass'n. of Realtors, 251 P.Zd 619 (Wash. 1953),
holding the filling in of a form warranty deed by a real estate broker is the unauthorized
practice of law even in a transaction in which he acted as broker where the deed was made
subject to two mortgages.
10. People v. California Protective Corp.. 76 Cal. App. 354, 244 Pac. 1089 (1926);
Boykin v. Hopkins, 174 Ga. 511, 162 S.E. 796 (1931); Re Matthews, 57 Idaho 75, 62
P.2d 578 (196); People v. Schafer, 404 Il. 45, 87 N.E.2d 773 (1949); State v. Richard-
son, 125 La. 644, 51 So. 673 (1910); Opinion of the Justices, 289 Mass. 607, 194 N.E.
3,13 (1935); Grand Rapids Bar Ass'n. v. Denkemna, 290 Mich. 56, 287 N.W. 377 (1939);
Fitchette v. Taylor, 191 Minn. 582, 254 N.W. 910 (1934); Clark v. Reardon, 231 Mo.
App. 666, 104 S.W.2d 407 (1937); People v. Alfani, 227 N.Y. 334, 125 N.E. 671
(1919); People v. Title Guarantee & Trust Co., 227 N.Y.366, 125 N.E. 666, reversing
180 App. Div. 648, 168 N.Y. Supp. 278 (1917), rehearing denied, 228 N.Y. 585,
127 N.E. 919 (1920); Land Title Abstract & Title Co. v. Dworkin, 129 Ohio St. 23,
193 N.E. 650 (1934); Rhode Island Bar Ass'n. v. Automobile Service Ass'n., 55 R.I. 122,
179 Atl. 139 (1935); Re Duncan, 83 S.C. 186, 65 S.E. 210 (1909); Union City Bar
Ass'n. v. Vaddell, 205 S.W.2d 573 (Tenn. 1947); See Notes, 111 A.L.R. 19; 125 A.L.R.
1173; 151 A.L.R. 781.
11. Gustafson v. Taylor & Sons, Inc., 138 Ohio St. 392, 35 N.E.2d 435 (1941);
Commonwealth v. Jones & Robbins, Inc., 186 Va. 30, 41 S.E.2d 720 (1947); Washington
State Bar Ass'n. v. Washington Ass'n. of Realtors, 251 P.2d 619 (Wash. 1953).
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resurrection of the previously discredited and impractical theory that the
practice of law in this field can be dissected and classified into two phases:
(1) those which are simple and require no great knowledge of law and (2)
those which are complex and require a lawyer's services. A few courts,
therefore, predicate decisions perinitting laymen to do phases of conveyancing
for others, where such laymen have an indirect interest in the transaction,
mainly upon the simplicity of the instruments, rather than upon a decision
on whether the interest of such laymen is direct enough in a transaction to
permit them, in effect, to practice law for themselves. 12
4. As applied to realtors, the real question presented is whether or
not the interest of a realtor in a transaction, because of his right to a
commission for effectuating the same, is sufficient and direct enough to
enable him to do those things which would otherwise be the practice of law
without being guilty of the unauthorized practice of law. There is a
difference of opinion among the courts as to how far this interest of a
realtor will permit him to go in this field. In some instances this difference
of opinion exists because of the comity given by the courts to statutory
provisions.'3
In other instances the difference of opinion exists because of the con-
fusion noted above, and in those cases the courts which permit realtors to
prepare deeds, mortgages, etc. which are "simple" taking refuge in applying
"common sense" instead of logic and reason, which would simply dictate a
narrowing of the interest theory as a solution to the problem, as has been
done by the better reasoned cases.14
The best reasoned cases limit the realtor's interest to the preliminary
contract, because this fixes his right to a commission, and in the majority
of instances he is a party to such a contract in a real sense, since either he
is named as escrow agent therein to hold the initial deposit or his commission
agreement is part and parcel of the same. Once the preliminary contract
is signed his interest thereafter is not direct enough to permit him to
draw the other instruments involved in consummating the transaction.15
These cases recognize that if there is a sufficient interest in conveyancing
either to make one a party to what he does or in practical effect a party,
so that what he is doing is primarily for himself and not primarily representa-
tion of other persons, the law in principle does not and cannot limit
activity to that which is simple and at the same time recognize, as it does,
that a party can be his own lawyer with the right to do both the simple
and the complex. Thus, recognition is given to the proposition that the
emphasis should be not upon the simplicity or complexity of the instrument,
but should be upon the sufficiency of the interest to determine and decide
12. Hulse v. Criger, 247 S.W.2d 855 (Mo. 1952); Childs v. Smeltzer, 315 Pa. 9,
171 Ad. 883 (1934)
13. Cowen v. Nelson, 207 Minn. 642, 290 N.W.795 (1940).
14. lulse v. Criger, 247 S.W.2d 855 (Mo. 1952); Childs v. Smeltzer, 315 Pa. 9,
171 Atl. 883 (1934).
15. Gustafson v. Taylor & Sons, Inc., 138 Ohio St. 392, 35 N.E.2d 435 (1941);
Commonwealth v. Jones & Robbins, Inc., 186 Va. 30, 41 S.E.2d 720 (1947).
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realistically whether the representation is primarily of oneself, or pre-
dominantly that of others. The "difference in degree" which should be
taken into account is in the interest, not the character of the instrument
as being "complex" or "simple", when both kinds are conceded to be the
practice of law if done for others by one without a real interest.
It is clear that those courts which emphasize the simple instrument
theory as the main reason for their holdings that a realtor in transactions
in which he acts as broker can prepare instruments subsequent to the sales
contract, reach an impractical, contradictory and ridiculous result when
they recognize, as they all do, that real estate brokers cannot prepare even
"simple" instruments in transactions in which they do not act as brokers,
thereby further recognizing, as they must, that even the preparation of
"simple" instruments is the practice of law.
FLORIDA'S APPROACH
The Supreme Court of Florida apparently recognized the real problem
in the Keyes case and placed the emphasis where it should be. It drew
the line where the direct interest of the realtor ends, instead of attempting
to draw it between simple and complex instruments. In this fashion, it
applied the principle that a person can represent himself by limiting the
realtor to the drafting of the preliminary agreement, and at the same time
assured to the public the overall knowledge of the lawyer to be exercised
in favor of the parties before transactions are consummated. It further
recognized, in effect, that if the simplicity of the act to be done is the test
to be applied in determining whether or not the act is the practice of
law, then there is no reason, in principle, why the whole field of the practice
of law including practice in the courts should not similarly be dissected
into those phases which are simple and those which are complex, and
thereby permit laymen to do the former. Wisely it prevented this and did
so without question in the public interest.
THE REALTORS' CoNTENTIOUS REFUTED
With complete disregard of the legal principles involved, realtors have
picked two sentences from the opinion in the Keyes case as conclusive
evidence that the court did not intend to hold that they cannot draft or
fill in forms of instruments subsequent to the preliminary contract if the
parties want them to do so. First the court stated, "If the parties themselves
wish a representative after the realtor has brought them together, they
should select him from the Bar."'18 The realtors contend that this language
is, in effect, merely advice to the parties to get a lawyer, but does not mean
that a realtor cannot fill in forms or draft instruments. It is obvious! that
the court in using this language was giving effect to other statements in
the opinion that the parties to a transaction themselves can do their own
conveyancing and are not required to hire a lawyer. The court clearly did
16. Keyes Co. v. Dade County Bar Ass'n. 46 Sold 605, 6C6 (Fla. 1950).
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not mean, in view of the boundary it esablished between the work of the
realtor and that of the lawyer, that everything clsc it had said was subject
to an additional condition that if the parties requested a realtor to practice
law le could do so because of their request.
The realtors say also that the most important language in the Keyes
case which indicates that the opinion was not intended to prohibit them
from filling in forms, is as follows:
We realize that situations will arise from time to time where
the boundary here attempted to be drawn will become indistinct,
but if the general principle we have undertaken to announce be
kept in mind, neither attorney nor realtor will infringe on the field
of the other, and the interests of a member of the public who seeks
expert advice in one of the fields, or both, will be safeguarded.
17
It has been stated that if the Florida Supreme Court intended that a
realtor be restricted to the drafting of the preliminary contract in the sale or
exchange of real esate, that the above language would not have been used,
because if the boundary between the work of the realtor and the work of
the lawyer is the preliminary contract, it could never become indistinct. A
careful analysis of the Keyes case clearly discloses the fallacy of this position.
For instance, the court after analyzing the real estate license law, stated the
following:
We have a very definite impression that the part of the realtor
is in its nature preliminary except in a matter of appraisals and,
in some instances, rentals, and that in most, if not all cases, certain
steps must ultimately be taken before the transactions between
those whom he represents and those with whom they deal may be
consummated by the exchange of instruments permanent in their
nature."9 (Italics supplied).
TEhe court thus recognized that in some transactions, particularly rentals,
that a preliminary contract is not drawn and that in this type of situation
"the boundary here attempted to be drawn will become indistinct."
It is significant to note at this point that the Florida Real Estate License
Law19 covers only sales, exchanges and leases of real property. It does not em-
brace within its terms mortgages of real estate or sales and exchanges of
personal property, including businesses. Thus, there can be no sanction within
its provisions for the drafting by a realtor of an agrcement to mortgage or an
agreement to sell a business or other personal property. So again, in these
fields "the boundary here attempted to be drawn will become indistinct"
because there is no statutory authority for the drafting by a realtor of the
preliminary agreement to mortgage real or personal property, or to sell
or exchange personal property, including businesses.
It might be said with some degree of logic that the court did not
expressly rule on the right of a realtor to prepare a lease when no preliminary
17. Id. at 607.
18. Id. at 606.
19. FLA. STAT. C. 475 (1951).
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contract to lease is drawn. However, the court clearly stated the rule for
what it termed to be most cases, which it illustrated with the typical
situation of a bargain and sale of real estate where a preliminary contract
is drawn to bind the purchaser. In these types of transactions the court
said that after the preliminary contract is drawn and executed, "Once this
point is reached the field is the lawyer's." '0
TiE ST. PEnr.RSBURO SUITS
Despite the Keyes case and the principles above pointed out, the trial
court in the St. Petersburg cases, per Judge Wehle, in a confused opinion
ruled that realtors in transactions in which they act as brokers, without
making a charge additional to their regular commission for effecting the
deal, may prepare:
...standard forms of deeds, purchase money mortgages, mortgage
notes, loan mortgages and leases, provided, however, that standard
recognized blank forms for such instruments are used and that the
broker, in completing such forms, inserts in them only such clerical
details as the dates, amounts, names of parties, latest tax year
liability and description of the property involved.
In addition to the specific limitations inherent in the quoted language, the
court added the following additional limitation:
\Vhcre the circumstances require the stating of further or more
complicated details, conditions, or terms, an attorney should prepare
or supervise the preparation of such instruments. 21 (Italics supplied).
Judge Wehle admitted in effect that his decision was made not upon logic,
but upon "common sense" and "public conveniience". He reasoned that
preliminary contracts are permitted to be prepared by realtors by some
courts, including the Supreme Court of Florida, as a "practical adjustment
to the realities of making a deal", and since it requires more knowledge of
law to prepare a preliminary contract than is required for some of the
subsequent instruments, courts which allow the preparation of the former
by realtors for "public convenience" are justified in permitting them to
prepare the latter and should permit this to be done. He further applied
the interest theory by expressly prohibiting realtors from preparing any
instruments in transactions in which they do not act as brokers. Thus, lie
extended the interest theory to instruments and terms which are "simple",
but, contrary to the legal principles involved, at the same time limited its
application so that "complicated" terms or instruments cannot be prepared
by realtors. Emphasis was thus placed upon the character of the instrument
involved as being "simple" or "complex" rather than upon a determination
of whether or not the realtor's interest is direct enough in the instruments
subsequent to the preliminary contract to justify the use of the interest
theory at all.
20. Id. at 606.
21. Coopernan v. Guarantee Abstract Co., Ch, No. 37,759, 6th Cir. Fla. 1953;
Cooperman v. West Coast Title Co., Ch. No. 37,760, 6th Gir; Fla. 1953.
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This is an attempted middle ground approach to the whole problem.
Like most of such approaches it falls short of the only adequate solution
for public protection, which is one that requires the overall knowledge of
the lawyer to be exercised at some stage before completion of a real estate
transaction usually involving the expenditure of large sums of money. The
overall knowledge of the lawyer is required even to decide whether "further
or more complicated details, conditions or terms" should be placed in
conveyancing instruments. It should hardly be necessary to comment that
a realtor who makes the decision that further or more complicated terms
need not be placed in an instrument, whether competent to make such a
decision or not, will not call the lawyer into a transaction to impeach his
own decision.
This opinion of the court in the St. Petersburg suits is also grounded
upon split premises, viz., a limited application of the interest theory and a
fallacious assumption that courts which permit realtors to prepare pre-
liminary contracts do so as a "practical adjustment to the realities of making
a deal". Actually, the courts permitting the preparation of the preliminary
contracts by realtors in deals in which they act as brokers, do so because of
the broker's interest in establishing his right to a commission because of
the preliminary contract. In addition, the Florida court in the Keyes case
found authority in the real estate license law to permit such preparation.
The courts, including the Florida court, hold that a realtor's interest
in the convenient collection of his commission is not direct enough to permit
him to prepare for other persons documents in which he has no real
interest. For instance, it has been held in Florida that the interest of a
realtor in his commission is not direct enough with the buyer to permit his
intervention in a suit for specific performance between the parties he
brought together, as his right to a commission is determined entirely from
his contract with the seller.
22
When the realtors become fully awakened to the real import of Judge
Wehle's opinion they should not be too comforted by it. There are very
few transactions which involve instruments containing merely the date,
amounts, names of parties, latest tax year liability and description of the
property involved, which was ruled to be the subject of preparation by
realtors. It would seem, for instance, under the express language of Judge
Wehle's opinion, that if a deed should recite that the property is taken
subject to mortgages' or subject to restrictions, these terms would have
to be prepared or supervised by a lawyer.
XVUAT REIMAINs To BE DONE
Final decrees have not been entered in the St. Petersburg cases. The
Florida Bar and the St. Petersburg Bar Association have filed with Judge
Wehle a supplementary brief asking for a reconsideration of his opinion,
and in the event that he does not change his decision, a request for clarifica-
22. Winkle, v. Neilingm, 153 Fla. 288, 14 So.2d 403 (1943).
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tion of the opinion. In the latter, the Bar has asked the court to state
definitely if any terms in instruments beyond the dates, amounts, names
of the parties, latest tax year liability and description of the property
involved must be prepared or supervised by a lawyer. The Bar has also
asked the court to state expressly whether instruments other than deeds,
purchase money mortgages, mortgage notes, loan mortgages and leases on
standard forms may be prepared by realtors. In the request for clarification
the lawyers have also asked Judge Wehle to decide whether or not realtors
can prepare preliminary agreements to mortgage real or personal property,
preliminary agreements to sell or exchange personal property, and the
subsequent instruments in such transactions,
In any event the St. Petersburg suits will be taken to the Supreme
Court of Florida for a final determination. Since the parties to these
suits include individual lawyers, a local bar association, the Florida Bar,
individual realtors and the Florida and St. Petersburg Boards of Realtors,
it is hoped that the final decision of the Supreme Court of Florida will
set at rest the major problems involved in the present controversy.
